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CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
Charles M. Rehmus*
I.

INTRODUCTION

years ago, three adjoining school districts in Michigan
agreed to cooperate in establishing a high school vocational education program. Vocational education is expensive, requiring substantially more funds for facilities and staff than most other educational programs. The contemplated three-district plan would have
allowed each district to provide its students with a vocational curriculum far superior to that which any single district could have
offered alone.
While these plans were under consideration, the Michigan
legislature in 1965 amended its Public Employment Relations Act
of 1947.1 The 1965 amendments imposed a duty upon school districts, cities, and counties to bargain collectively with public employees on "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.''2 The new legislation gave public employees the right to
select exclusive bargaining agents by means of a majority vote in
an appropriate bargaining unit, and it obligated public employers
to bargain in good faith with the bargaining representatives thus
certified. If the employing agency violated any of its statutory duties,
the bargaining agent could file an unfair labor practice charge with
the Michigan Labor Mediation Board. The new legislation did not,
however, eliminate that part of the original 1947 legislation which
prohibited strikes by public employees.
Pursuant to this new legislation, teacher organizations in each
of the three Michigan school districts referred to above qualified for
recognition and began collective bargaining with their respective
school boards. In nvo of the districts, bargaining over salaries proved
difficult. Without a master contract, the teachers threatened not to
report to the classrooms for the opening of the fall semester. However, in both of these districts the crisis was averted; the school boards
simply took from their reserve operating funds the amounts that had
EVERAL
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been allocated for the new vocational education program and applied them toward improvements in faculty salary schedules. As a
result, plans for the cooperative venture had to be dropped.
The point of this story is not to decry public employee bargaining. The teachers in the districts involved undoubtedly had legitimate complaints over their salaries. Readjustments in teacher salary
schedules have long been overdue. The critical national shortage of
qualified and certified teachers is too well known to require exposition. But vocational education is also of great importance to our
society. Should it have been shunted aside because of what happened
at the bargaining table? Unfortunately, the boards of education involved really had no choice but to divert funds from this promising
cooperative program. Despite the continued prohibition of strikes
by public employees in the 1965 legislation, Michigan has thus far
been unable effectively to prohibit teacher strikes.3 The school
boards either had to find the money to settle their teacher disputes
or suffer a prolonged extension of summer vacation.
Some of the most experienced and distinguished students and
practitioners of industrial relations in the country take the position
that all strikes against the government must be prohibited.4 Their
basic view is that such strikes undermine our political democracy
and are, therefore, intolerable. This position, although argued with
logic and brilliance, is from the point of view of local government
administrators merely an exercise in coruscating on thin ice.
Public employees who are dissatisfied with the offers made to
them at the bargaining table have shown themselves to be extraordinarily resourceful in devising effective means for bringing pressure
upon their employers. While it is one thing to say that strikes and
other lesser forms of disruptive "work action" are or should be illegal, it is quite another to formulate enforceable sanctions to deal
effectively with these pressures.
If fifty per cent of a police force refuses to work overtime or to
write traffic tickets, is discharge an appropriate punishment? Alternatively, what should administrators do if police officers enforce the
3. By virtue of School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206
(1968), the injunctive remedy is available against strikes by public employees. The
granting of such an injunction is subject to traditional equity considerations, however,
and will not automatically be granted against teacher strikes.
4. See, e.g., A. Anderson, The Developing State of Collective Bargaining for Public
Employees (address before the University of Chicago Conference on Public Employees
and Collective Bargaining), Feb. 5, 1965 (mimeograph); Hildebrand, The Public
Sector, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 125 (1967).
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traffic laws so rigidly that they increase the rate of ticketed violations
fivefold? If most of a city's bus drivers come down with "blue flu,"
is a two-week disciplinary suspension a valuable remedy? What sanction can be used against firemen who are available to fight fires but
who refuse to do inspection, clean-up, or paper work in connection
with their jobs? If three quarters of a district's school teachers are
willing to resign rather than submit to an injunction, where can replacements be found? Absent effective means for eliminating these
pressures (and none has yet been found), local administrators who are
responsible for collective bargaining with public employees must
have the freedom and flexibility to meet at least the minimum of
employee demands. In most states the administrators of local government have not yet been given such latitude. If public employee
bargaining is to operate effectively, state legislatures must grant
greater freedom to local governmental units to raise funds and to
determine the elements of the employment relationship. Failing this,
the unwavering demands of employees for a major voice in setting
their wages and working conditions will mean more bargaining impasses, strikes, and disruptive work pressure with disastrous results
for the public.
It is to the basic financial and administrative constraints upon the
powers of local governing units that this Article is primarily directed.
The examples used are taken largely from Michigan experience and
Michigan law. The same limitations upon the financial and administrative powers of local government, however, exist in almost
all other states. The Michigan experience with public administration
and public employee bargaining should provide both a warning and
a guide to other states as they cope with the so-called public employee
revolution.

II.

FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

Three major sources of revenue are available for financing government: taxes on sales, on income, and on property. Of these, the
property tax is the workhorse of local government; it accounts for
ninety per cent of local tax revenues in the United States. 15 Local
governments in Michigan-municipalities, counties, and school districts-have no authority to levy sales taxes, 6 and the development
5. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FEDERALISM 21 (1967).
6. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 205.51 (1967).
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of city income taxes is just beginning.7 Thus, Michiganders have
traditionally relied heavily on the property tax not only to finance
city and village governments, but also to support townships, counties,
and school districts. In many areas, three or four local governing
units, not to mention special district authorities, all depend upon the
same overburdened property tax base. Nevertheless, the state legislature, jealous of its own tax sources and protective of its citizens, has
not permitted much change in local taxing structure. The new Michigan Constitution adopted in 1963 theoretically delegated broad taxing powers to home rule charter cities.8 Despite this, the state legislature has reserved most nonproperty taxes to itself and has prohibited
municipalities from levying such taxes without specific legislative
authorization.9 Moreover, Michigan, like most states, limits the total
amount of millage that can be levied upon property without specific
authorization from the voters.10 The specific constitutional limit in
Michigan upon a city council's unrestricted taxing power is eighteen
mills, and another fifteen mills must be divided among township
boards, county supervisors, and school boards.11
Even those cities that desire to tax themselves more heavily often
find that the legislature forces them to beg for the privilege. States
that permit cities to levy income taxes frequently place limitations
upon the amounts that can be obtained through this resource. It is
common to find statutes which restrict municipalities to a flat rate
rather than a progressive income tax, limit the percentage of residents' income which they can tax, and place even more severe limitations upon the percentage of commuters' incomes which they can
reach. Michigan, for example, limits city income taxes to a flat rate
of one per cent and the tax on commuters' incomes to half that
amount.12 Moreover, state legislatures commonly allow voters a veto
over new city income taxes, a privilege seldom if ever accorded for
similar state levies. Under the uniform Michigan city income tax law,
the imposition of city income taxes is subject to a protest refer7. At the present time, fewer than 200 cities in the United States levy an income
tax, but growth of tbis form of taxation will undoubtedly expand rapidly.
8. See MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22.
9. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.91 (1967).
10. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 6. Pennsylvania is an important exception. It is alone
among the states whose public employees are strongly organized and which permit
local governing bodies to levy unlimited property taxes without specific voter author•
ization.
11. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 6.
12. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.611 (1967).
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endum.13 In order for city councils to obtain an affirmative vote in
these referendum elections, they must often promise the voters major
property tax reductions. Thus, the amount of new money generated
is limited, and much of the purpose of the new taxes is defeated.
Related to this, the Michigan Constitution prohibits cities from issuing general obligation bonds without an affirmative vote of property
owners. 14 Consequently, many cities, rather than attempting to get
the voters to approve capital bonds, squeeze capital improvements
out of their operating millage and further limit the resources available for short-run operational flexibility.
These constitutional and legislative constraints upon the taxing
powers of home rule charter cities are sometimes aggravated by the
cities themselves. Some cities have in their original charters limited
the total operating millage which they can levy administratively to
an amount lower than the state-imposed twenty-mill maximum.15
This handicaps them further in generating the funds necessary to
meet employee demands.
In summary, a state-imposed obligation upon local governments
to negotiate wages and fringe benefits inevitably entails increased
budget expenditures for employee compensation. If the state simultaneously maintains existing limitations upon the unilateral taxing
power of local governments, the situation often becomes intolerable.
Local government administrators are helplessly caught between employee compensation demands, public unwillingness to vote for increased operating millage levied on property, and the state legislature's reluctance to allow local governments the freedom to impose
income, sales, or excise taxes.
An example which highlights the problem recently occurred in
Detroit. Following both a "ticket-writing strike" and a "blue flu"
epidemic among police officers, the disputants finally referred the
issue of police salaries to a neutral three-member panel for recommendations. The panel found that police officers' salaries should be
substantially increased. Money to pay the recommended increases
could be found on an emergency basis within Detroit's current
operating budget, but beyond the first year, the panel concluded:
the City of Detroit urgently needs new taxing authority which can
be granted only by the State Legislature.... Detroit is in serious
13. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 141.503 (1967).
14. MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 6.
15. Only six of the sixteen largest cities in Michigan are presently levying the
twenty-mill maximum.
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financial trouble, and we join others who have suggested that the
State Legislature raise the authorized level of the municipal income
tax, to restore the authority to levy local excise taxes, and to revise
the 2 percent restriction on property tax levies.16
The problem of .financial straight-jacketing in the face of collective bargaining pressure is equally serious for school districts. Collective bargaining for Michigan public school teachers appears to
have produced annual pay increases averaging ten to twenty per cent
higher than those which the teachers would otherwise have received.17 Over all, the salaries of Michigan teachers have increased
by about one third in the last three years. Most, if not all, of these
increases were long overdue, but they resulted in severe pressure on
school district budgets. In the 1966-1967 academic year, the first full
year of teacher bargaining under the 1965 Act, these increases in
teacher compensation were paid for largely from minor economies
and from new revenues. Among the new revenue sources were increases in state aid, imposition of previously authorized millage,
and growth in assessed valuation. In the second full year of collective bargaining, however, school districts began to use less desirable
sources of funds to pay the wage increases demanded by organized
teachers. Administrators generated new sources of funds through
liquidation of operating reserves and contingency funds, transfer of
millage from building and site reserves to operating accounts, and
substantial program cutbacks. Most important-and despite the fact
that Michigan law is generally construed to forbid school districts
from deficit financing18-a quarter of the school districts studied in
one survey showed a deficit by the end of .fiscal 1968.
The financial constraints on local governments constitute the
most serious problem they face in coping with public employee collective bargaining. However, public officials must contend with at
least three other problems which, although related to financing, are
not as severe as the shortage of funds per se. The first problem is that
of coordinating the budget-making process with collective bargaining. An acute aspect of this problem is the difficulty which local governmental units face in meeting budget deadlines, particularly when
the state legislature itself imposes the deadlines. The collective bar16. Detroit Police Dispute Panel, Findings and Recommendations on Unresolved
"Economic" and Other Issues 32-33 (Feb. 27, 1968, unpublished mimeo).
17. The statements in this paragraph are based upon C. REHMus &: E. WILNER,
THE ECONOMIC REsULTS OF TEACHER BARGAINING (1968).
18. l 1959-1960 BIENNIAL REP. Arr'Y GEN. 147 (Mich. 1959),
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gaining process often entails months of negotiations, mediation, and
fact-finding or arbitration; it does not respect time limits. Yet budgets must be filed under the law, and this requires local officials to
make preliminary estimates. As a result, municipalities may often
feel constrained to take rigid positions based upon estimates which
were submitted to the legislature before bargaining is completed.
A second aspect of the coordination problem arises after budget submission deadlines have been passed: the issue then is whether negotiated pay increases should apply prospectively from the date of the
agreement or retroactively from the beginning of the budget period.
Finally, it may be difficult to synchronize legislative decisions concerning the amount of funds to be allocated to local governmental
units with local governmental responsibilities in the bargaining
process. For instance, teacher bargaining for the 1967-1968 school
year in Michigan proved exceptionally difficult because the state
legislature failed to act on the school aid formula until August 1967.
Consequently, spring and summer bargaining in many school districts dragged on beyond budget submission deadlines because school
administrators were unable to predict how much state funding would
be available to help them meet teacher demands. The state legislature avoided this problem the following year by acting on the school
aid formula in April, well before budget deadlines. Perhaps as a
result, a smaller number of bargaining impasses occurred during
teacher negotiations for the 1968-1969 school year. This problem of
coordinating the budget-making process with collective bargaining
is more an irritating than an insurmountable obstacle. The difficulties can be minimized by using open-ended budgets, resorting to
short-term internal and external borrowing, allowing more time for
bargaining before budget deadlines, and negotiating collective bargaining contracts for longer terms than are currently settled upon.
A second complication of collective bargaining in the public
sector results from the tradition that public budgets and accounts
are not secret documents. In the private sector the employer may
under most circumstances refuse to disclose his profit and loss figures,
but the public employer is forced to open his books to all interested
persons. As a result, any operating reserves or contingency funds that
may be available simply become targets for the employees to shoot at.
Prudent management-whether in business or in public administration-ordinarily requires the retention of some operating reserves.
It is not reprehensible for a public administrator to maintain a re-
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serve account to pay operating costs in periods before tax money
becomes available or to provide for unforeseen contingencies. In
practice, however, even if cities and school districts have not had to
resort to deficit financing in order to meet collective bargaining
demands, the retention of operating reserves has proved almost impossible. Many cities and most school districts in Michigan, their
reserves depleted to satisfy the bargaining demands of employees,
are now operating on little better than a year-to-year cash basis. In
jurisdictions where reserves remain, this result has often been accomplished by padding various budget items-a recurrent practice but
hardly one to be encouraged.
A third anomaly of collective bargaining in the public sector is
that the union can often invade the management decision-making
structure. Particularly in public school and junior college districts,
organized teacher groups have succeeded in electing their members,
relatives, or sympathizers to school and governing boards. Under
these circumstances it is often impossible for the management decision-making group to hide its bargaining strategy and tactics from
employees. Democratic government does allow almost anyone to run
for office, but this tactic may make collective bargaining a farce.
III.

OTHER STATE-IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS ON
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

State legislatures have imposed many limitations upon the authority of local governmental units to manage their own personnel
systems. One of the most common limitations is the statutory or
de facto requirement that home rule cities establish a civil service
and merit system for recruitment and promotion of personnel.19 This
requirement, although beneficial in its thrust and general impact
upon city government, operates to reduce substantially the flexibility
of local governmental units at the collective bargaining table. State
legislatures have seldom given enough thought to the problems that
may be encountered when they impose a collective bargaining requirement covering "terms and conditions of employment"20 upon
an existing merit structure.
The civil service concept ordinarily contemplates the establishment of a nonpartisan board or commission at the local or state level
19. 1967 Executive Committee of the National Governors' Conference, Preliminary
Report of Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations 36-37.
20. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967).
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with rulemaking authority to assure adherence to the merit principle. In practice, merit systems have over the years grown to encompass many aspects of employee relations and personnel management other than recruitment, classification, and promotion. These
new areas of concern include the handling of grievances, employee
training, salary administration, safety, morale, and attendance control programs-the very subjects that most employee organizations
regard as appropriate for bargaining. If an independent civil service
commission has authority over bargainable matters, then perhaps
bargaining responsibilities should lie with the commission. But as it
is, authority to bargain is usually vested in the chief executive officer
of the local government unit. If he has the duty to bargain over the
terms and conditions of employment while authority over many personnel matters remains with an independent commission, the scope
of negotiations will be unduly restricted.
This problem is not insoluble. If the principle of collective bargaining by local governments is to be effectuated, all nonmerit functions should be transferred from the civil service commission to a
personnel department under the chief executive officer of each local
unit. In practice, however, such a transfer of authority has seldom
been made. In Massachusetts, for example, the state collective bargaining law for public employees specifically states that it shall not
"diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission,
or any retirement or personnel board established by law .... " 21 The
Wisconsin public employment relations statute22 excludes from the
mandatory scope of bargaining a large range of matters established
by law or governed by civil service. In practice, in localities where
public employee collective bargaining is fully developed, informal
bargaining arrangements to deal with these problems are already
appearing.23 At the very least, any state considering collective bargaining legislation for public employees should carefully analyze its
personnel system in order to minimize the potential conflict between
bargaining relationships, existing merit systems, and the rules promulgated by civil service boards and commissions.
21. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1967).
22. WIS. STAT._§ 111.91 (Supp. 1967).
23. For example, Michigan's Wayne County has created special labor boards with
the power to negotiate collective agreements with employees. The labor board for a
negotiation is composed of a representative of the county Civil Service Board, a representative of the county Board of Supervisors, and a representative from the particular administrative unit involved (such as the county Highway Department).
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State legislatures contemplating collective bargaining in the public sector should also ensure that they have not imposed undue
restrictions upon the permissible scope of bargaining. Some years ago
the Michigan legislature imposed upon its municipalities a fifty-six.hour maximum duty week for firemen. 24 This law not only raised
municipal fire protection costs substantially, but also eliminated
from the scope of bargaining one of the major subjects which should
have been left there. In Pennsylvania, the state legislature prohibited
combined police-fire departments, 25 another potentially bargainable
subject. Laws of this kind place many local governments, particularly
smaller communities, in a Procrustean bed. These municipalities are
obligated to bargain over wages and hours, yet uniform state laws
fundamentally weaken their negotiating position by creating mandatory high-cost requirements without the freedom to trade cost
reductions in one area for new expenditures in another.
State legislatures have also limited the negotiating flexibility of
school boards. For example, the Attorney General of Michigan has
recently ruled that under existing law boards of education lack
statutory authority to award severance pay, to pay for any unused
portion of sick leave at the end of a school year or upon termination
of employment, or to reimburse teachers' tuition for college credit
courses beyond the baccalaureate degree. 26 Under the Michigan collective bargaining statute, school boards had assumed prior to the
Attorney General's ruling that they were obligated to bargain on all
of these subjects, and concessions had in fact been made on many.
Probably a majority of existing teacher collective bargaining agreements in Michigan call for one or more of these payments that have
now been declared to be unlawful. The attempt of school boards to
negotiate such benefits back out of existing contracts is likely to
engender bitter conflict. A new grant of authority to make the disputed payments would seem to be a preferable alternative.
Another important source of conflict is the discrepancy between
union security arrangements in collective bargaining agreements and
the provisions of state teacher tenure laws. The Michigan Labor
Mediation Board has ruled that union security-specifically, an employee demand for an agency shop-is a mandatory subject of bar24. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.841 (1967).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1969) (by implication).
26. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 4583 (Oct. 11, 1968), No. 4667 (Feb. 24, 1969) (clarifying no. 4583).
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gaining, at least so far as home rule counties are concerned.27 A number of Michigan school boards, assuming that this ruling applied to
them as well, have agreed to agency shop clauses in their master
contracts. These provisions ordinarily call for terminating the employment of bargaining unit members who refuse to pay either union
dues or an equivalent agency fee. Yet a basic condition of the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act is that a school board must show a "reasonable and just cause" relating to job performance for terminating a
tenured teacher's employment.28 This conflict between Michigan's
Public Employment Relations Act and its Teacher Tenure Act must
ultimately be resolved by the state supreme court. In the meantime,
the conflict illustrates graphically the kinds of problems that can
arise when a legislature mandates collective bargaining and simultaneously continues to legislate terms or conditions of employment
for the employees of local governmental units.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A classic dilemma faces the management negotiator who has been
instructed, "Don't give them anything, but don't let them strike."
Increasingly, administrators of local units of government find themselves trying to carry out such impossible orders. The constraints
that state constitutions and state legislatures place on local governing units have existed for many years. Most of them find their origins
in jealousy over taxing power and the fear that locally elected and
appointed officials might prove unresponsive to the state legislature's
standards of "good government." Many limitations have been retained in an attempt to remove certain subjects from local collective
bargaining altogether. In an environment where local administrators
must negotiate their employees' wages and working conditions with
employee representatives, these limitations on local authority are
real obstacles to effective collective bargaining.
Freedom to trade one proposal for another and to balance cost
reductions in one area against new expenditures in another is essential to bargaining flexibility. Freedom to raise new money to meet
employee demands, or to withstand the consequences of refusal, is
an equally essential part of the collective bargaining process. Much
of this freedom and flexibility is presently denied local administra27. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. & Metro. Council No. 23, Case No. C66 F-63
(Michigan Labor Mediation 13d. Jan. 10, 1968).
28. MICH.

COMP.

LAws .ANN. § 38.101 (1967).
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tors. As a result, local public employee bargaining has resulted in
impasses and employee pressure tactics more often than should have
been necessary. Many of these problems would not be so serious if
public employee bargaining were merely a transitory phenomenon.
But Pandora's box has been opened. Employees who have gained a
real voice in setting their compensation levels and their working conditions will not readily give up the collective bargaining process which
has so often brought them real benefits. It is essential, therefore, that
the administrators of local governmental units be given greater freedom than they now have to negotiate and to raise funds. Continued
failure to grant them authority commensurate with their bargaining
responsibilities is hardly likely to be in the public interest.

